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Pollution taxes are believed to burden low-income households that spend a greater than average share
of income on pollution-intensive goods.  Some propose to offset that effect by returning revenue to
low-income workers via reduced labor tax.  We build analytical general equilibrium models with both
skilled and unskilled labor, and we solve for expressions that show the change in the real net wage
of each group.  A decomposition shows the effect of the tax rebate, the effect on the uses side of income
(higher product prices), and the effect on the sources side of income (relative wage rates).  We also
include numerical examples.  Even though the pollution tax injures both types of labor, we find that
returning all of the revenue to the low-skilled workers is still not enough to offset the effect of higher
product prices.  Moreover, changing wage rates may further hurt low-skilled labor.  In almost all of
our examples, the rebate of all revenue to low-skilled labor still does not prevent a reduction in their
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Market-based pollution policies, such as taxes or tradable emissions permits, can 
efficiently address environmental problems by forcing polluters to take into account the 
full cost of pollution.  In order to evaluate policies and determine the tradeoffs among 
competing goals of economic efficiency and distributional objectives, it is important to 
know not only the overall costs and benefits of environmental policies but also the effects 
they have on different people.  Additionally, the distribution of the costs depends on what 
is done with any revenue.  Emissions permits that are distributed freely to polluting firms 
do not generate any government revenue, but pollution taxes or auctioned permits do.  
The way in which the government spends this revenue or redistributes it to taxpayers 
helps determine the final incidence of the policy.   
  One of the common arguments against pollution taxes is that households with 
lower income tend to spend a larger fraction of their income on polluting or pollution-
intensive goods, so a tax that raises the prices of polluting goods may disproportionately 
hurt those with low income.  However, a pollution tax may affect not only output prices, 
but relative wage rates as well.  To consider both the uses side and the sources side of 
income, this paper employs a new analytical general equilibrium model in the spirit of 
Harberger (1962) to solve for the incidence of a pollution tax when the government has a 
revenue neutrality requirement.  Unlike the standard Harberger model with labor and 
capital, however, our simple model assumes two types of labor:  skilled and unskilled 
labor.  Any exogenous shock such as a change in the pollution tax can change the 
demand for skilled labor relative to unskilled labor, and thus can affect relative wage 
rates.  We assume that low-income unskilled workers spend a higher fraction of income 
on the polluting good, and that government tries to offset this effect by using pollution 
tax revenue to reduce pre-existing labor taxes on low-income unskilled workers.  Then 
we can solve for effects on each wage rate to determine the distribution of net burdens 
from this overall tax reform.  We show that this rebate is not enough to offset higher 
prices for pollution-intensive goods such as gasoline, electricity, and home heating oil.  
Moreover, changes in factor prices can further burden low-income families. 
  Related to this topic is a literature on the “double dividend”, the notion that an 
environmental tax reform can clean up the environment and generate revenue to cut pre-
existing distortionary taxes.  Several studies using analytical and computational general 
equilibrium models have studied this question about revenue-neutral environmental   -2-
policy reform, but the question is about efficiency rather than distributional effects.
1  
Although some of these studies solve for the change in wage rate, they do not discuss 
equity issues and do not report whether the real low-skilled wage rises or falls. 
  A few papers do consider the distributional side of an environmental tax swap, 
using computational models.  Using data on the carbon content of different products and 
the purchases of different income groups, Metcalf (1999, 2009) shows how an 
environmental tax reform could be made less regressive or perhaps not regressive at all.  
Using both annual income and lifetime income as measures of well-being, he finds that 
the use of pollution tax revenue to reduce taxes for low-income households may be 
distributionally neutral or even slightly progressive.  Burtraw, Sweeney and Walls (2009) 
also calculate incidence based on product price increases (without factor price changes).  
Dinan and Rogers (2002) use a general equilibrium model with labor and capital, but they 
do not show distributional effects on the sources side.  They study the distributional 
effects of a permit system that seeks a 15% decrease in carbon emissions, where the 
permits are either auctioned off or given away.
2  West and Williams (2004) empirically 
estimate the uses-side incidence of a gasoline tax under several scenarios, one of which is 
using tax revenue to decrease the tax on labor.  They find a gain in efficiency and a 
decrease in the regressivity, but the gas tax is still not progressive.
3 
  To our knowledge, no paper in this literature employs analytical general 
equilibrium models to analyze the distributional effects on both the uses side and sources 
side from a revenue-neutral pollution tax, where the tax revenue is used to lower a pre-
existing labor tax (such as the U.S. payroll tax).  A limitation of computational models is 
that the specific result depends on assumptions about parameter values.  In contrast, this 
paper finds closed-form solutions for the change in the real unskilled wage and skilled 
wage.  Since these solutions hold for any parameter values, they show general conditions 
under which the relative real wage ratio rises or falls.  We also use plausible parameter 
values to calculate burdens on each type of labor. 
The model here builds upon the model of Fullerton and Heutel (2007), where 
                                                 
1 See Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994a, 1994b, 1998), Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg (1994), Parry (1995), 
Goulder (1995), Bovenberg and Goulder (1997), Parry et al (1999), and Fullerton and Metcalf (2001). 
2 They assume that government can use permit revenue to cut corporate taxes, to cut payroll taxes, or to 
give households lump-sum rebates.  The last scenario is the only one that might not be regressive.   
3 Hassett et al (2009) emphasize redistribution on a lifetime basis and by region.  Metcalf et al (2008) use a 
computational model with tax shifting to labor and capital.  
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labor and capital are used in both sectors, and pollution is used in only one of them. They 
assume one representative household, so they do not distinguish different expenditure 
patterns, and they employ no revenue-neutral rebate.
4  As with their model, we assume 
two inputs into production along with pollution, and no assumptions are made about the 
functional form for production.  Here, however, we distinguish two groups of households. 
Instead of using labor and capital as the production inputs, this paper uses unskilled and 
skilled labor, abstracting from the use of capital.  Low-income unskilled workers spend a 
higher fraction of income on pollution-intensive goods. Thus the focus remains on real 
relative burdens borne by high and low wage earners, with a swap of a higher pollution 
tax for a lower unskilled wage tax.  All of the prior general equilibrium incidence studies 
mentioned above consider labor to be one homogenous input.
5   
Here, we allow for two different types of labor, where the wage for skilled 
workers may rise or fall relative to the wage for unskilled labor.  Other studies have 
shown the effects on rising wage inequality from various exogenous shocks.  Higher 
demand for skilled labor relative to unskilled labor may occur with changes over time in 
technology, trade patterns, globalization, labor force composition, and other exogenous 
changes.
6   Similarly, a pollution tax could increase relative demand for skilled labor and 
raise the equilibrium skilled wage rate, if firms substitute out of pollution and into skilled 
labor.  Conversely, it could increase the unskilled wage rate if firms substitute more into 
unskilled labor.  Which is more likely?  These cross-price substitution parameters have 
never been estimated, but we suggest that any major environmental policy reform is 
likely to spur sophisticated abatement technologies that favor high-skilled labor.   
Given the generality of our model, the pollution tax is not guaranteed to raise the 
price of the dirty good, or even to reduce pollution.
7  Yet such possibilities do not merely 
confirm the notion that "in general equilibrium, anything can happen."  To avoid that 
                                                 
4 Instead, they assume that the government uses pollution tax revenue to purchase the two commodities in 
the economy in the same proportion as do households. 
5In these prior models, some individuals may have a larger endowment of effective labor units, but every 
labor unit earns the same wage rate.  Therefore, individuals at all income levels with different endowments 
are affected the same way when the single wage rate changes in response to an environmental tax.    
6 Several papers focus on the role of skill-biased-technical-change and the effect on relative skilled and 
unskilled wages, including Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1991), and Berman et al. (1994).  
Hanson and Harrison (1999) consider trade liberalization as an explanation for rising wage inequality, and 
Autor et al. (2005) evaluate the effect of shifts in labor force composition. 
7 Such possibilities were shown in Bovenberg and de Mooij (1998) and in Fullerton and Heutel (2007).  
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trap, we carefully categorize those perverse cases and show that they require extreme 
parameter values that are highly unlikely.  Our paper is not about perverse cases.  Even 
without those perverse cases, however, we demonstrate multiple ways in which low-
income workers might suffer despite receiving all of the tax rebate.  We say nothing 
about whether low-income families “ought” to be protected, only whether they can be 
protected from a fall in their real net wage rate. 
We decompose the change in their real net wage into the effect on their gross 
wage, the effect of the tax rebate, and the effect of product prices.  Both groups face 
higher product prices, and yet we find that the return of all additional pollution tax 
revenue just to the low-income group is still not enough to offset the effect of higher 
product prices on their real net wage.  One reason is that burdens on the two groups 
exceed the pollution tax revenue (because of deadweight loss or “excess burden”).  This 
effect is not captured in papers mentioned above that focus just on product prices and 
return of revenue.  Moreover, we find that additional changes in relative wage rates may 
offset or exacerbate that burden on low-skilled workers.  Based on our data, the dirty 
sector is low-skilled intensive, so the pollution tax reduces demand for low-skilled labor 
and suppresses their wage.  In addition, the low-skilled wage may fall if the pollution tax 
induces substitution into high-skilled labor and out of low-skilled labor.  Their relative 
wage can only rise if low-skilled labor is a good enough substitute for pollution to offset 
the fact that the polluting sector is low-skill intensive and the fact that the tax rebate is 
not enough to offset their disproportionate spending on the dirty good.  In almost all of 
our numerical examples, the real net wage of low-income workers falls.  Only in rare 
cases would the return of revenue protect low-income workers. 
The first section below presents the theoretical model.  Section II shows solution 
results and analyzes special cases in order to interpret them.  Section III discusses these 
results and the implications.  Section IV undertakes a numerical calculation based on 
those theoretical results, and Section V concludes. 
I.  The Model 
  The model presented here is similar to one in Fullerton and Heutel (2007), with 
the addition of three features: we consider two household and labor types instead of one, 
we model the government’s revenue neutrality condition, and we solve for the labor tax 
reduction that exactly rebates the extra pollution tax revenue.   
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One household supplies high-wage skilled labor, while the other household 
supplies low-wage unskilled labor.  The low-income families spend a disproportionately 
high fraction of income on pollution-intensive products like gasoline, electricity, and 
heating oil (Metcalf 1999, 2009).  We assume that government tries to offset their added 
burden on the uses side by using the extra pollution tax revenue to lessen the payroll tax, 
a pre-existing tax on the labor of low-wage families.  The incidence of the new tax 
system on the sources side is characterized by the proportional changes in the two wage 
rates, in response to a small exogenous increase in the pollution tax.
8   
  The setting for the model is a perfectly competitive two-sector economy, with 
production of a “clean” good, denoted by  X,  and a “dirty” good, denoted by  Y.  Skilled 
and unskilled labor are used to produce both goods, and pollution is also an input in the 
dirty sector.  The outputs are taxed at rates  τX  and  τY,  so the prices faced by consumers 
are  pX(1+τX)  and  pY(1+τY),  respectively.  The constant returns to scale production 
functions are  X=X(LX, HX)  and  Y=X(LY, HY, Z),  where  L  is low-skilled labor with 
wage  w,  H  is high-skilled labor with wage  h, and  Z  is pollution.  The use of pollution 
is also taxed, so the price of pollution is simply its tax rate,  τZ.
9  Both types of labor are 
mobile between the two sectors, with fixed total amounts of each (L  and H ).  Resource 
constraints for these two inputs are  LX + LY = L   and  HX + HY = H .  Totally 
differentiating the resources constraints yields 
  ˆ  H  XλHX + ˆ  H  YλHY = 0         ( 1 )  
  ˆ  L  XλLX + ˆ  L  YλLY = 0         ( 2 )  
where a hat indicates a proportional change  ( ˆ  H  X = dHX/HX ),  and  λij  is sector  j’s  
share of input  i  (e.g., λHX = HX /H ). 
  Producers of  X  can substitute between skilled and unskilled labor according to an 
elasticity of substitution, σ X.  Rearranging the definition of  σ X  provides a behavioral 
equation describing how producers of  X  respond to any change in input prices,  pL  and  
                                                 
8 We started this model with one type of labor and one type of capital, just as in Fullerton and Heutel 
(2007) and many other papers back to Harberger (1962), but we soon realized that those two factors do not 
clearly delineate who has high income or low income.  The ratio of capital income to labor income plotted 
against total income reveals a U-shaped pattern, primarily because low-income retirees may have no labor 
income.  A lifecycle model is way beyond the scope of this paper.  Instead, the two types of labor in this 
paper clearly identify who has high income or low income.  Skilled labor differs from unskilled labor, the 
ratio of their use may differ by industry, and either one might be a better substitute for pollution. 
9 The pollution tax rate,  τZ, is a per unit tax, whereas  τX  and  τY  are ad valorem tax rates.  
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pH,  namely   ˆ  H  X − ˆ  L  X =σX(ˆ  p  L − ˆ  p  H)
pL = w(1
.  These two input prices are the costs that producers 
face and are gross-of-tax, so  +τL) and  pH = h(1+ τ H).  We assume that the 
increased pollution tax   τZ   generates revenue used to lower  τL,  the wage tax on low-
skilled labor.  For simplicity, all other tax rates are assumed to stay constant (τX ,  τY , and  
τH).  Thus, the proportional change in the price of low-skilled labor is   ˆ  p  L = ˆ  w + ˆ  τ  L  
where   ˆ  w ≡ dw/w,  but where we define  ˆ  τ  L as  dτL /(1+τL).  Since  τ H  does not 
change,   ˆ  p  H = ˆ  h .  Thus we have: 
ˆ  H  X − ˆ  L  X =σX( ˆ  w + ˆ  τ  L − ˆ  h  )
aHH ˆ  p  H + aHL ˆ  p  L + aHZ ˆ  p  Z
  .         ( 3 )  
  Because the dirty sector uses three factors of production, it has slightly more 
complicated responses.  The firms’ input demands are functions of input prices and 
output.  Following Mieszkowski (1972), differentiate these demand functions to get:  
ˆ  H  Y = + ˆ  Y 
ˆ  L  Y =
ˆ  Z =
aij =e
aLH ˆ  p  H + aLL ˆ  p  L + aLZ ˆ  p  Z +
aZH ˆ  p  H + aZL ˆ  p  L + aZZ ˆ  p  Z +
ij
ˆ  Y 
ˆ  Y 
   
where  aij  is the elasticity of demand for factor i with respect to the price of factor  j.  
Then   θYj,  where  eij  is the Allen elasticity of substitution between inputs i and j 
(Allen, 1938), which is negative when the two inputs are complements and positive for 
substitutes.  Also,  θYj is the share of sales revenue from  Y  that is used to purchase factor 
j (e.g., θYH = h(1+ τ H)HY /pYY
pZ =
).  In the case where a tax per unit of pollution is the only 
price of pollution, then     and  ˆ  τ  Z (where   /pZ  and   τZ ˆ  τ  Z ≡ dτZ ˆ  p  Z = ˆ  p  Z ≡ dpZ /τZ).  
Substitute the Allen elasticities and the proportional price changes into the differentiated 
factor demands above, and subtract the third equation from the first two: 
ˆ  H  Y − ˆ  Z =θYH(eHH −eZH)ˆ  h +θYL(eHL −             eZL)( ˆ  w + ˆ  τ  L)+θYZ(e eZZ)ˆ  τ  Z               (4)  HZ −
           L  ˆ 
Y − Z =θY ˆ 
H(eLH −eZH)h +θYL(eLL −eZL)( ˆ  w + ˆ  τ  L)+θYZ(eLZ −eZZ)ˆ  τ  Z ˆ                   (5) 
These two equations represent how producers of  Y  react to changes in prices and tax 
rates that are attributable to an exogenous increase in the pollution tax,  τZ. 
  The perfect competition and constant returns to scale assumptions imply that sales 
revenue in each sector equals the sum of payments to factors of production.  
Differentiating these conditions, we have: 
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ˆ  X + ˆ  p  X =θXH(ˆ  h + ˆ  H  X)+θXL( ˆ  w + ˆ  τ  L + ˆ  L  X)            ( 6 )  
ˆ  Y + ˆ  p  Y =θYH(ˆ  h + ˆ  H  Y)+θYL( ˆ  w + ˆ  τ  L + ˆ  L  Y)+θYZ(ˆ  τ  Z + ˆ  Z ).     (7) 
  Then, using the perfect competition assumption, differentiate each sector’s 
production function to describe how output quantities change with inputs: 
  ˆ  X =θXH ˆ  H  X +θXL ˆ  L  X               ( 8 )  
  ˆ  Y =θYH ˆ  H  Y +θYL ˆ  L  Y +θYZ ˆ  Z .               ( 9 )  
In order to discuss the distribution of net burdens in the simplest possible way, we 
assume that the economy has two types of consumers, low-skilled and high-skilled 
laborers, where subscripts  L  and  H  denote these groups (e.g.  XL  is the amount of good  
X  consumed by low-skilled workers).  These two groups may spend on  X  and  Y  in 
different proportions, but they have the same elasticity of substitution in utility,  σU,  
between  X  and  Y.  This simplifying assumption makes the model easier to solve, and 
yet does not detract from the purpose of the paper to find effects on these two groups.  
The elasticity of substitution has major impacts on economic efficiency, but it has only 
second-order effects on burdens.  The first-order impact of   ˆ  p  X and   ˆ  p  Y on the relative 
burden of each group is the major pre-existing difference in the fraction of income that 
each group spends on Y.  Rearranging the definition of  σU  yields behavioral equations 
that show how the two consumers’ demands respond to changes in output prices: 
ˆ  X  L − ˆ  Y  L = σU(ˆ  p  Y − ˆ  p  X) (10) 
ˆ  X  H − ˆ  Y  H =σU(ˆ  p  Y − ˆ  p  X) (11) 
            The two goods are purchased by both types of workers.  The total quantity of 
good  X  can then be expressed as  X = XL + XH,  and similarly Y = YL + YH.  
Differentiating these equations yields: 
  ˆ  X = ˆ  X  L
XL
X
+ ˆ  X  H
XH
X
         ( 1 2 )  
  ˆ  Y = ˆ  Y  L
YL
Y
+ ˆ  Y  H
YH
Y
.          ( 1 3 )  
The government budget constraint requires a fixed amount, G, matched by tax revenue: 
  G = τZZ + hτ HH + wτLL+ pYτYY + pXτXX. 
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Rather than specify direct government spending on  X  and  Y,  we say that the fixed 
revenue  G  is returned to the two groups [δG to the high-income group, and  (1-δ )G  to 
the low-income group].  Since  G  is fixed, these lump-sum transfers are fixed and do not 
affect our results.  Only the increase in pollution tax revenue is used to cut  τL  (leaving  
G  fixed).  With the revenue neutrality condition (dG = 0) and the assumption that only 
tax rates  τZ  and  τL   can change, we differentiate the government budget constraint and 
rearrange to solve for the proportional change in the labor tax:
10 
ˆ  τ  L =
1
L pL
[−ZτZ(ˆ  τ  Z + ˆ  Z )− H hτ H ˆ  h −τL ˆ  w − pYτYY(ˆ  p  Y + ˆ  Y )− pXτXX( ˆ  X + ˆ  p  X)].          (14) 
  The two consumer groups allocate spending on the two goods according to their 
preferences and budget constraints.  For example, the budget constraint for skilled labor 
is   pX(1+ τX)X H + pY(1+ τY)YH = h(HX + HY) + δG.  Of the two spending equations, one 
is independent.  The second can be derived from the first, using Eqs. (6) and (7).  
Therefore, only one consumer group budget constraint is necessary, and differentiation of 
the skilled labor budget constraint yields: 
  pX(1+ τX)X H(ˆ  p  X + ˆ  X  H)+ pY(1+ τY)YH(ˆ  p  Y + ˆ  Y  H) = h(HX + HY)ˆ  h .                  (15) 
  Equations (1)-(15) are fifteen linear equations in sixteen unknowns:     
.  Good  X  is chosen as numeraire, so that  
, ˆ , ˆ , ˆ
X Y X L H H
L H L Y H L X Y Z Y Y Y p X X X p h w L τˆ   and   , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ
ˆ  p  X = 0
ˆ 
.  The model can be solved through successive substitution to obtain equations for 
each of the remaining fifteen endogenous variables in terms of exogenous parameters and 
the exogenous change in the pollution tax, τ  Z. 
II.  Results 
  The variables of most interest are the price changes, to determine the relative 
incidence on skilled and unskilled labor.  Table 1 shows solutions for these selected 
variables and the change in pollution,   ˆ  Z . 
The expressions for   and   are “closed form” solutions, because they contain 
only parameters and the exogenous policy shock (
H p ˆ L p ˆ
ˆ  τ  Z), but the expression for   contains  w ˆ
L τˆ  (which is endogenous).   All of these solutions can be expressed just in terms of 
                                                 
10 Tax rates  τX  and  τY  are fixed, but changes in  X  and  Y  will affect revenue. 
     -9-
exogenous parameters and   ˆ  τ  Z, but that would make the expressions much longer.  For 
example, a closed-form solution for   ˆ  Z   can be obtained by substituting expressions for  
ˆ  h   and   ˆ  w + ˆ  τ  L  into the   ˆ  Z   expression shown in Table 1, and that  ˆ  Z   can be used to 
obtain closed-form expressions for  ˆ  τ  L and  ˆ  w .   
  Table 1:  Proportional changes in prices, wage rates, and amount of pollution 
  Z τ U L H HZ
YZ
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  For further simplification, parameters are combined into definitions.  That is,  γ H  
and  γL  are relative factor intensities.  Our data below indicate that  H L γ γ > , so the dirty 
sector is low-skilled labor intensive (or, equivalently, the clean sector uses skilled labor 
intensively).  The constants  A  and  B  are difficult to interpret, but they are weights on 
the terms involving the Allen elasticities (eij).  In equations (16), these terms represent 
“substitution effects” and indicate how producers of  Y  substitute among inputs when 
pollution becomes more expensive.  The constant  C  partly determines the change in 
pollution ( ˆ  Z ) in (16d).  The constants  A,  B,  and  C  are all positive, but the denominator  
D  cannot be signed in general.  Constants  TX  and  TY  represent tax payments received 
by the government on the two goods prior to the pollution tax increase, and these help to 
determine the magnitude of the decrease in the unskilled labor tax rate.  The  E  constants 
that appear in the solution for   ˆ  τ  L  help determine how the substitution effects impact the 
magnitude of   ˆ  τ  L.   The terms  N  and  J  summarize the relative consumption of the two 
goods by the two consumer groups.  While  N  can be shown to be positive, the sign of  J  
is ambiguous without additional assumptions (discussed below).
11 
Two effects appear in (16a), (16b), and (16c) that are comparable to effects 
identified by Mieszkowski (1967) and discussed by Fullerton and Heutel (2007).  First, 
the “substitution effect” is the term [A(eHZ – eZZ) – B(eLZ – eZZ)].  Through this term, the 
higher pollution tax ( ˆ  τ  Z > 0) tends to help high-skilled labor ( ˆ  h  > 0) whenever  eHZ  is 
larger than  eLZ,  that is, when  H  is a better substitute for pollution than is  L.  Second, 
the “output effect” is represented here by the term (γ H −γL)(σUN + J)
0 (
.  If low-skilled 
labor is used more intensively in the dirty sector, then ) < − L H γ γ .  Because  σU  and  N  
are both positive, then the first part of this term, (γ H −γL)σUN is negative.  A higher tax 
on emissions,  ˆ  τ  Z, reduces the dirty output in a way that depends on consumer preferences 
represented by  σU,  and therefore reduces demand for  L  relative to  H  (reducing  w  and 
raising  h).  It places more burden on the factor intensively employed in the dirty sector. 
The additional term  J  means that this effect on factor prices also depends on the 
relative consumption by the two groups.  For concreteness, assume that low-skilled 
consumers spend a greater proportion of income on the dirty good than do high-skilled 
consumers.  In other words, assume  YL/XL  exceeds  YH/XH, which makes  J  negative.  
                                                 
11 By rearranging terms, N = (xL+αHxH)/xL + (1–αH)yL/yH  where both terms are positive. 
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The additional  J  term does not appear in results of Fullerton and Heutel (2007) 
because they assume government spends the tax revenue in the same way as the one 
representative consumer.  Here, the extra tax revenue is rebated to unskilled labor, with 
disproportionate spending on the dirty good, so this particular use of the revenue 
increases purchases of  Y.  This  J  term helps the factor used intensively in Y, offsetting 
the usual output effect.
12  
Because the solutions for these variables are complicated, with offsetting effects, 
the determination of the overall sign of each is difficult.  In this most general case, the tax 
on pollution might even reduce the price of the dirty good, or increase the amount of 
pollution.  Therefore, we employ special cases that simplify the expressions and allow 
more definitive results.  The rest of this section focuses on the sources side of income, 
and a later section focuses on the uses side. 
Case 1:  Equal Factor Intensities (γ H = γL = γ) 
For the first special case, suppose that the two sectors have the same ratio of high-
skilled to low-skilled labor ( X Y X Y L L H H / / = ).  This condition eliminates the output 
effect, (γ H −γL)(σUN + J) and leaves the sign of each price change to depend only on the 
substitution effects – the  eij  parameters.  In this simple case, the solutions are: 
where D1 = (σX −θXLθYHγeHH −θXHθYLγeLL)+ γ(θXLθYH +θXHθYL)eHL.  In this case,   ˆ  p  Y  in 
(17a) is clearly positive, since  θYZ
ˆ 
  is positive, and because the pollution tax is increased 
(τ  Z > 0).  The sign of   ˆ  h   depends on whether  eHZ > eLZ  and  D1 > 0.  To put a sign on 
this denominator, define  




The denominator D1 is positive if and only if Condition 1 holds.  Since  eHH < 0,  eLL < 0, 
and all other terms are positive, the ratio on the right side of the inequality is strictly 
                                                 
12 The  N  and  J  terms show how expenditure patterns affect demands for  X  and Y, and thus demands for  
L  and  H, with effects on the sources side.  Later, we show how different expenditures affect the uses side.  
                                                                                       ˆ ˆ ) ( ˆ ˆ ˆ
                                                                             ˆ ) ( ˆ ˆ
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negative.  For this condition to hold, it is sufficient that  eHL > 0, which means that low-
skilled labor and high-skilled labor are substitutes.  More generally, Condition 1 may still 
hold if low-skilled and high-skilled labor are not too complementary. 
  If that condition holds, and high-skilled labor is a better substitute for pollution 
than unskilled labor (eHZ > eLZ), then the pollution tax raises the high-skilled wage  
( ˆ  h  > 0).  If Condition 1 fails, and the two types of labor are “too” complementary, then  
ˆ  h   is negative.
13  Less unlikely is that Condition 1 holds but unskilled labor is a better 
substitute for pollution, where again  ˆ  h   is negative.
14  
The sign of   ˆ  w   depends on   ˆ  τ  L  and on the   term (with sign opposite to that of 
).  The extra pollution tax revenue is used to reduce the low-skilled tax, so 
L p ˆ
H p h ˆ ˆ = ˆ  τ  L is 
negative.
15  The reduction in this tax rate has a powerful, positive impact on  ˆ  w ,  since the 
goal of the tax swap is to raise the net wage for low-income families.  If unskilled labor is 
a better substitute for pollution than is high-skilled labor (eLZ > eHZ), then the   term in 
(17c) is positive, as long as  D1  is positive.  In that case 
L p ˆ
ˆ  w   is unambiguously positive.   
The positive effect of   ˆ  τ  L  on   ˆ  w   can be overwhelmed, however, if unskilled labor is 
enough less of a substitute for pollution (eHZ >> eLZ), so that a reduction in  Z  leads to a 
large reduction in demand for  L.  Then the net unskilled wage may fall.  
Table 2 summarizes these results and conditions.
16  In the first row of Table 2, eHZ 
< eLZ, so low-skilled labor is a better substitute for pollution, and the increased pollution 
tax definitely raises the net low-skilled labor wage (even before accounting for  ˆ  τ  L < 0).
17  
In the next two rows of Table 2, high-skilled labor is a better substitute for pollution than 
low-skilled labor, a situation that tends to help high-skilled labor and reduce the low-
                                                 
13 Intuition is difficult for the perverse case where Condition 1 fails and  D1 <0.  How could the pollution 
tax hurt high-skilled labor, even though H is a better substitute for pollution (eHZ > eLZ)?  The higher price 
of pollution induces substitution into H, but if L and H are sufficiently complementary, then the firm wants 
to employ more L, which raises w relative to h.  
14 If both conditions fail, so that  D1 < 0  and  eHZ  <  eLZ,  then  h  would rise. 
15 We assume that the pollution tax rate is on the normal side of the Laffer curve, so that increasing the rate 
yields additional revenue that can be used to cut  τL.  
16 The   ˆ  τ  L  term is endogenous.  The three conditions in Table 2 can be expressed in terms of exogenous 
parameters only, but these conditions would then be extremely long and complicated. 
17 But even this case does not guarantee that  L  is held harmless, because this analysis does not yet account 
for the effect on  L  from spending disproportionately on  Y  when   > 0.  So far, we discuss only the 
sources side (  and  ), but later we discuss effects on the two groups from the uses side (  > 0). 
Y p ˆ
w ˆ h ˆ
Y p ˆ
     -13-
skilled wage.  In the second row, the decrease in τL is not enough to overcome this injury, 
so the net-of-tax low-skilled wage falls.  In the third row, however, the decrease in  τL  is 
large enough to offset this burden, so that the low-skilled wage rises.  The intuition for 
the sign of   ˆ  h   is similar and depends on whether low-skilled labor or high-skilled labor is 
a better substitute for pollution.  Since the high-skilled labor tax rate does not change, 
though, any burden on the high-skilled wage cannot be offset by tax changes. 
Table 2:  Changes in w and h for the case of equal factor intensities    
If high-skilled labor and unskilled labor are not too complementary (D1>0):  ˆ  h   ˆ  w  
(1)  eHZ < eLZ     (unskilled labor is a better substitute for pollution)  < 0  > 0
(2)  
eHZ > e    and                        
ˆ  τ  L >
− θYZγ(eHZ − eLZ)
D 1
LZ
θXH ˆ  τ  Z      
    
> 0  < 0
(3)  
eHZ > e    and
ˆ  τ  L <





ˆ  τ  Z
 
> 0  > 0
Case 2:  Equal Factor Intensities and eHZ = eLZ 
  This case is a special version of Case 1 with equal factor intensities (γ H = γL = γ), 
with the additional requirement that low-skilled labor and high-skilled labor are equally 
substitutable for pollution.  In this most simple case, the solutions are now just: 
(18c)                                                                                                                            0 ˆ
(18b)                                                                                                               0 >   ˆ ˆ












The change in the price of  Y  is the same as in Case 1 and is positive.  Whereas equal 
factor intensities removes the output effect, setting  eHZ  =  eLZ  removes the substitution 
effect.  Now relative wage rates do not change at all ( 0 ˆ ˆ = = H L p p ), but pollution tax 
revenue is used to cut the low-skilled labor tax ( L τˆ  < 0, so  > 0).  These simplifying 
assumptions remove factor price effects and leave only the product price effects analyzed 
by Metcalf (1999, 2009) and Burtraw et al (2009).  The remaining question, analyzed 
below, is whether the rebate is enough to overcome the burden from 
w ˆ
ˆ  p  Y > 0. 
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Case 3:  Fixed Input Proportions (eij = 0) 
  In this case, all the elasticities are set to zero, so that the substitution effects 
disappear, and only the output effects remain.  Now results are driven by whether sector 
Y is high-skilled labor intensive or low-skilled labor intensive.  The solutions are: 
(19c)                                                    ˆ ˆ ) )( ( ˆ ˆ ˆ
(19b)                                                                ˆ ) )( ( ˆ ˆ
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The denominator  D3  can be positive or negative, depending on whether the dirty sector 
is low-skilled or high-skilled labor intensive, as well as on other parameters.  Even with 
the removal of the substitution effects, the results are still complicated and difficult to 
sign.  An additional simplification is that the elasticity of substitution in consumption 
between  X  and  Y,  σU, is equal to unity (the value used in the numerical section of 
Fullerton and Heutel, 2007).  This simplifying assumption means that the term (σUN + J) 
is now unambiguously positive, and it allows us to sign the results based on factor 
intensities in the dirty industry and several other conditions.  The Appendix contains a 
diagram of these sub-cases and shows the signs of   ˆ  p  Y,   ˆ  h ,  and   ˆ  w . 
  When the dirty sector is high-skilled intensive (γH >γL), the results are definitive:   
pY  increases,  h  decreases, and  w  increases.  These results are consistent with the 
intuition stated earlier that the output effect places more of the burden on the factor used 
intensively in the dirty sector.  When the dirty industry is low-skilled intensive (γH  < γL), 
the situation is more complicated.  In this case, unskilled labor might be hurt despite their 
tax cut.  Also, the dirty good’s price could actually decrease.  When the industries have 
very different factor intensities, so that  γL  is much larger than  γH, then  w  likely 
decreases.  The output effect hurts intensively-used unskilled labor, which can overtake 
the opposing decrease in the tax on unskilled labor.  A full categorization of results for 
case 3 is provided in Figure 1 of the Appendix. 
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III.  Effects on the Uses Side 
  Thus far, we have only discussed the effect that a pollution tax swap has on the 
sources side of income for both types of workers.  We next consider the uses side and 
changes in the real net unskilled wage.  Define  ,  where     is 




Q L L p w p p / / ) 1 ( = − ≡ τ ω pQ
L
pQ
L ≡ αLpY(1+τY)+(1 −αL)pX(1+τX)
illed wage: 
.
18  Differentiation yields 
Y L
L
Q p p ˆ ˆ α = .  We then calculate the change in the real net unsk
    .              ( 2 0 )  
L
Q L L p p ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ − − = τ ω
This equation nicely decomposes the effect on the real net wage into three components: 
the change in the gross wage, the change in the tax rate, and the change from product 
prices.  Similarly, define the real net wage for skilled labor as 
H
Q H H p p / ) 1 ( τ ψ − ≡
H
  
,  with analogous definitions of     and  αH..  Since  
H
Q p h/ = pQ
H τ  is fixed, we have: 
H
Q H p p ˆ ˆ ˆ − = ψ .           ( 2 1 )  
  In Case 1 with equal factor intensities, we show above that  ˆ  p  Y > 0,  so   ˆ  w   may be 
positive or negative.  Thus   ˆ  ω   is definitely negative when   ˆ  w <0;  in particular, when 
high-skilled and unskilled labor are not too complementary, and low-skilled labor is 
highly complementary with pollution, then the real unskilled wage falls.   For   ˆ  w > 0 , it 
is more likely that the real net wage increases if  αL  is small, that is, if unskilled laborers 
do not spend too disproportionately on good  Y.  Case 2 simplifies the analysis even 
more, with the additional assumption that high-skilled labor and unskilled labor are 
equally substitutable for pollution.  In this case   ˆ  p  Y > 0, and the real wage increases if  
−ˆ  τ  L >αL ˆ  p  Y.  Thus, if the wage tax cut is very large, or if unskilled workers do not spend 
too much on  Y, then their real wage is likely to rise. 
  Case 3 is unique because   ˆ  p  Y  may be positive or negative.  Therefore,   ˆ  ω   is 
definitely positive when   ˆ  w > 0  and   ˆ  p  Y < 0.  Otherwise, as before,   ˆ  ω   may still be 
positive as long as unskilled labor’s expenditure share on  Y  is not too large.  It is also 
possible that   ˆ  ω  > 0  in the perverse case where both the net wage and   fall.  Y p
                                                 
18 The weight  L α  is unskilled labor’s share of expenditures on  Y  (using initial values, so  L α  is a fixed 
parameter).  Thus,   ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( /[ ) 1 ( L Y Y L X X L Y Y L Y p X p Y p τ τ τ α + + + + ≡
) /( L L L L X Y Y
.   Below we set initial prices to 1.0 
and output tax rates to zero, so we have   + ≡ α .   
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  We now summarize all our analytical results.  Ignoring unlikely perverse cases 
where  pY  may fall or  Z  may rise, we have identified several reasons that the real net 
wage of low-income workers (ω) may fall, even when pollution tax revenue is used to cut 
their labor tax rate.  First, ω may fall if  H  is better than  L  as a substitute for pollution.  
Second,  ω may fall if the dirty sector is low-skill intensive.  Third, ω may fall if low-
skill labor spends disproportionately on the dirty good. 
IV.  Numerical Analysis  
  Because the general model’s results are complicated and difficult to sign, we now 
assign plausible parameter values and solve numerically for changes in wage rates and 
other variables.  We then can change certain parameter values, in a sensitivity analysis, to 
see if and when extreme parameter values generate perverse results.  This section 
provides only an illustration of plausible magnitudes in the analytical model, however, 
not a fully detailed numerical simulation of the pollution tax reform (particularly since 
we omit capital and changes in returns to capital).   
We use several data sources.  First, we define the “dirty” sector as the fourteen 
most polluting industries using data from the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) for 
2006.  The “clean” sector then includes all other industries.
 19  The TRI contains 
information on nearly 650 chemical releases for various kinds of manufacturing, electric 
utilities, and metal and coal mining. We use this information along with data from the 
Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey from 2007 in order to identify factor 
income shares for each sector.
20  The OES has data on employment and average wages 
for each of over 800 occupations, grouped by NAICS industry code.  We classify skilled 
labor as occupations with mean annual wage of at least $50,000.  Adding total 
compensation to workers in the clean sector implies that the clean sector represents about 
                                                 
19 No industry is perfectly “clean”, especially when considering intermediate inputs that are ignored here.  
We simply separate the dirtiest 14 from other industries.  These initial steps follow Fullerton and Heutel 
(2007), but here we use more recent data.  TRI industry data use 3 and 4-digit NAICS codes.  Aggregating 
to the 3-digit level, the industries we put in the “dirty” sector are those with the most on- and off-site 
disposal of monitored chemicals:  mining, utilities, chemical manufacturing, primary metals, paper 
manufacturing, waste management, food manufacturing, beverage and tobacco manufacturing, petroleum 
and coal product manufacturing, fabricated metals, transport equipment, plastics and rubber manufacturing, 
nonmetallic mineral products manufacturing, and wood products manufacturing.  The “clean” sector is 
comprised of the remaining 75 industries. This data set is available at 
http://www.epa.gov/triexplorer/industry.htm. 
20 The Occupational Employment Statistics survey is available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
website:  http://www.bls.gov/data. 
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93% of income.
21  The share of the clean sector’s compensation to low-skilled workers is 
about 54%, and the share of the dirty sector’s compensation to low-skilled workers is 
about 64%, indicating that the dirty sector is indeed low-skilled labor-intensive. 
  This information allows us to specify that θXL = 0.54 and θXH = 0.46 in the clean 
sector.  In the dirty sector, however, we do not have data on the fraction of sales revenue 
attributable to pollution, so we cannot yet determine all factor shares.  Following 
Fullerton and Heutel (2007), we choose θYZ = 0.25.  The remaining 75% of sales revenue 
is paid to labor, of which 64% is to low-skilled labor (so  θYL = 0.48), and the remainder 
to high-skilled labor (so θYH = 0.27).  We define a unit of each input or output so that all 
initial prices are one (w = h = pZ = pX = pY = 1).  Also, perfect competition implies zero 
profits, so  X = (1 + τH)HX + (1 + τL)LX  and  Y = (1 + τH)HY + (1 + τL)LY + Z.  Defining 
total factor income to equal one as well means that  (1 + τX)X + (1 + τY)Y = 1.  Using all 
these relationships, we can then solve for all the initial factor allocations and parameters 
shown in the top portion of Table 3. 
Table 3: Summary of parameters 
  HY   = 0.017    LY   = 0.029 
  HX   = 0.301    LX   = 0.459 
  θYΗ   = 0.317    θYL   = 0.433 
  θXH   = 0.455    θXL   = 0.545 
  λHY   = 0.052    λLY   = 0.059 
  λHX   = 0.948    λLX   = 0.941 
  γH   = 0.055    γL   = 0.063 
τH = 0.4,  τL = 0.1 
τX = 0,     τY = 0,   τZ = 1 
αH = 0.05,   αL = 0.12 ,   δ  = .39 
 
 
  We also need numerical values for the tax rates (τX, τY, τH, and τL), expenditure 
shares (αH  and  αL), the fraction of initial tax revenue returned to high-skilled labor (δ), 
and elasticities.  We choose zero for the tax rates on X and Y, 10% as the tax rate on 
unskilled labor, and 40% as the tax rate on skilled labor.
22   
                                                 
21 For each industry, we multiply employment in each skilled occupation by the mean annual wage for that 
occupation, and sum over all skilled occupations to calculate total compensation to skilled labor.  Similarly, 
for unskilled labor, we take employment in each occupation times the mean wage for each, and sum. 
22 Excise and other output taxes in the two sectors are similar to each and do not add much to the model, so 
we choose the simplest case where the tax rates on X and Y are both zero.  Labor tax rates of 10% and 40% 
for unskilled and skilled labor, respectively, approximate payroll and income taxes for the two groups.  
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  We approximate the expenditure shares for each group of workers using data on 
income quintiles from the 2007 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).  The bottom three 
quintiles correspond to our low-skilled workers, with average pre-tax incomes of 
$10,531, $27,674, and $46,213 respectively.  The top two quintiles, representing high-
skilled workers, have mean incomes of $72,460 and $158,388.  We add up expenditure 
per quintile on natural gas, electricity, fuel oil, and gasoline in order to obtain an 
approximation of the fraction of income spent on the “dirty” good.
23  This yields αL = 
12% (so 0.88 is the fraction spent on the clean good by low-skilled workers) and αH = 
5% (so 0.95 is the fraction spent on the clean good by high-skilled workers).  We assume 
that initial government revenue is simply distributed in proportion to each group's initial 
income, so  δ  = 39%.  
We use an elasticity of substitution in production for the clean sector of one, and 
an elasticity of substitution in utility of one (following Fullerton and Heutel, 2007).  No 
study has estimated which factors of production are better substitutes for pollution, 
especially for our two factors (high-skilled and low-skilled labor).  The point here is to 
see how much these Allen cross-price elasticities matter, so we use values ranging from  
–1  to 1.  These then determine the own-price elasticities.  We are now able to solve for 
the relevant magnitudes in changes from the initial equilibrium, as shown in Table 4. 

















Row  eHZ e LZ  Z ˆ   w ˆ   h ˆ  Y p ˆ  
1  1 -0.5  -3.932 0.173  0.124  2.494 
2  0 0  -2.932 0.285  0.012  2.499 
3  0.5 0 -4.567 0.195  0.048  2.498 
4  1 0  -6.190 0.105  0.083  2.496 
5  -0.5 0.5 -3.488 0.311 -0.065  2.503 
6  0 0.5  -5.148 0.219 -0.029  2.501 
7  0.5 0.5 -6.797 0.128  0.007  2.500 
8  1 0.5  -8.433 0.038  0.043  2.498 
9  -0.5 1 -5.676 0.246 -0.106  2.505 
10  0 1  -7.350 0.154 -0.069  2.503 
11  0.5 1 -9.012 0.062 -0.033  2.501 
                                                 
23 Our dirty industries include mining, chemicals, and primary metals, but these outputs are not purchased 
directly by consumers and so do not appear in the CEX.  The most pollution-intensive consumer goods 
categories are natural gas, electricity, fuel oil, and gasoline.  Consumer expenditure for these four 
categories is about 6.8%, which is close to our definition of the dirty sector (representing 7% of income).   
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Table 4 shows results for the relevant changes of interest, assuming that the 
pollution tax rate increases by 10%.  The different rows show results when the elasticities  
eHZ  and  eLZ  are varied, while  eHL  is held constant at a value of one (so skilled and 
unskilled labor are substitutes).
24  For all of the combinations of parameters shown in the 
table, the increase in the pollution tax always reduces the amount of pollution ( ) 
and increases the price of the dirty good ( ). 
0 ˆ < Z
0 ˆ > Y p
In all rows, the output effect dampens the unskilled wage, since the dirty sector is 
L-intensive.  The net wage for unskilled workers (w) always rises, however, because it 
includes the rebate of pollution tax revenues through the reduction in  τL.  The overall 
changes in  w  are quite small, ranging from about 0.04% to 0.31%.  This net wage rises 
most when the substitution effect favors low-skilled labor, that is, when L is a better 
substitute for pollution (when  eLZ > eHZ ,  as in rows 5 and 9).  The price of the dirty good 
rises, however, so the effect on the real net wage is not yet clear.   
In Table 4, the changes for the high-skilled wage ( ˆ  h ) are positive or negative, but 
small in magnitude.  Through the substitution effect, the higher pollution tax tends to 
raise the high-skilled wage ( >0) whenever  eHZ > eLZ  (high-skilled labor is a better 
substitute for pollution than is unskilled labor, as in rows 1, 3, 4, and 8).  When  eLZ >eHZ, 
however, the high-skilled wage falls (in rows 5, 6, 9, 10, and 11).   
h ˆ
While changes in both real net wage rates may be small, the taxed sector is only 
7% of national income.  The nationwide wage rates are driven primarily by the clean 
sector, which employs 93% of labor.  Thus, even a 10% higher pollution tax has only 
small effect on  w  relative to  h.  As shown in Case 2 above, the tax has no effect on 
relative wage rates when factor intensities are the same in the two sectors and substitution 
parameters are equal (eHZ = eLZ).  The extra pollution tax also collects only a small 
amount of revenue.  Indeed, the change must be small for our linear approximations to be 
valid.  The fact that it’s small, however, does not detract from our ability to address the 
question in this paper, namely whether the rebate of all extra revenue is enough to make 
up for higher product prices and for changes in factor prices.  The answer to that question 
is based on our decomposition of all effects on each real net wage rate. 
                                                 
24 We also tried  eHL = eHZ = eLZ =1, where the implied own-price elasticities are:  eHH = –2.2,  eLL = –1.2, 
and   eZZ = –3.  These elasticity value are not “perverse”, but they do not result in positive additional 
revenue, violating our assumption that the pollution tax rate is on the normal side of the Laffer curve. 
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We undertake that decomposition in Table 5, where the rows correspond exactly 
to the rows of Table 4, as indicated by  eLZ  and  eHZ  in the first two columns.  Then 
column (3) shows just the effect on the gross nominal wage  pL, which already includes 
both the output effect and the substitution effect.   The output effect always acts to reduce 
the low-skilled wage, because the dirty sector is low-skilled labor intensive.  The 
substitution effect exacerbates that output effect when  eLZ < eHZ  (as in the first row), and 
it offsets the output effect when  eLZ > eHZ  (as in rows 5, 6, 9, 10, and 11).   
 














   (6) 
Real Net 










Row  eHZ e LZ 
L p ˆ   L τˆ −  
L
Q p ˆ −       ω ˆ =   H p ˆ  
H
Q p ˆ −   ψ ˆ =  
1 1  -0.5  -0.103  0.277  -0.299    -0.126  0.124 -0.125 -0.001 
2 0  0  -0.010  0.295  -0.300    -0.015  0.012  -0.125  -0.113 
3 0.5  0  -0.040  0.235  -0.300    -0.105  0.048 -0.125  -0.077 
4 1  0  -0.069  0.175  -0.300    -0.194  0.083  -0.125  -0.042 
5  -0.5  0.5  0.054  0.257  -0.300     0.011  -0.065  -0.125  -0.190 
6  0 0.5 0.024 0.195 -0.300    -0.081  -0.029 -0.125 -0.154 
7 0.5  0.5  -0.006  0.134  -0.300    -0.172  0.007 -0.125  -0.118 
8 1  0.5  -0.036  0.074  -0.300    -0.262  0.043  -0.125  -0.082 
9 -0.5 1  0.088 0.158 -0.301    -0.054  -0.106 -0.125 -0.231 
10  0  1  0.058 0.096 -0.300    -0.147  -0.069 -0.125 -0.194 
11 0.5 1 0.028 0.034 -0.300    -0.238  -0.033 -0.125 -0.158 
The real net wage change is   for low-skill labor,   for high-skill labor. 
L
Q L L p p ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ − − = τ ω
H
Q H p p ˆ ˆ ˆ − = ψ
 
Column (4) shows the effect of the tax rebate,  τL,  which always helps low-skilled 
labor.  Interestingly, the amount of that rebate varies, because it depends on the amount 
of revenue from the pollution tax.  That pollution tax revenue is small when pollution 
abatement is relatively easy, so the rebate is small when both types of labor are good 
substitutes for pollution (rows 8 and 11).  The final component is the effect of product 
prices,  ,  in column (5), which always reduces the real net wage.  These three 
components add to the total effect on the real net wage ω in column (6).   
L
Q p
The real net wage falls in almost every case ( 0 ˆ < ω , where  ).  It 
rises slightly in row 5 only, where low-skilled labor is much better than high-skilled labor 
as a substitute for pollution (eLZ > eHZ).  This result answers the key question of our 
paper: only under special conditions can the rebate of revenue to the low-income group 
necessarily protect them against a loss in real income. 
L
Q L L p p ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ − − = τ ω
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An estimated distribution of elasticities in Table 5 could be used in a Monte Carlo 
simulation to calculate the expected change in the real net wage  ω.  Without such 
estimates, we cannot state the probability of each row in Table 5.  Yet the table makes 
clear that Monte Carlo simulations are not necessary.  Any feasible set of probability 
weights for the rows of Table 5 could only yield an expected fall in the real net wage. 
Importantly, the decomposition allows us to address why the real net wage falls.  
Notice first that the effect of the rebate is relatively large.  In this model, however, the tax 
rebate in column (4) is never enough to offset the effect of product prices in column (5).  
This result seems somewhat remarkable, since the pollution tax places some burden on 
high-skilled labor as well as on low-skilled labor, and yet all of the pollution tax revenue 
is given as a rebate just to low-skilled labor!  Why?  In this general equilibrium model, 
because of “excess burden”, consumers lose more than the revenue from the tax, 
especially in the cases where abatement is easy (where eLZ  and  eHZ  are both positive, 
and revenue is small, as in rows 8 and 11).
25   
Thus, the rebate of the entire tax is not enough to protect low-income families just 
from the effects of higher prices for electricity, heating fuel, and gasoline.  This problem 
is even worse when factor prices also change to hurt low-skilled labor, especially where  
H  is better than  L  as a substitute for pollution (rows 1,3, 4, 8). 
   In the last three columns of Table 5, the effect of the tax on the gross wage for 
high-skilled labor  ( ) plus the effect from higher produce prices, ( ) add to the 
effect on their real net wage (
H p ˆ
H
Q p ˆ −
ψ ˆ ).   The gross nominal wage may rise or fall, depending 
on elasticities, but high-skilled labor gets no rebate in this tax swap.  The effect of higher 
prices always swamps any positive effect on the wage rate, however, so the real net wage 
always falls.  In Table 5, both real net wage rates always fall (except for a tiny gain to 
low-skilled labor in row 5 discussed above).  
  So far, in all scenarios, our illustrative parameters have yielded positive values for 
the change in the nominal net low-skilled wage ( ˆ  w  > 0 in every row of Table 4).  We 
next perform sensitivity analysis to see the effect on  w  with more extreme parameter 
values.  As described in Case 1 of the previous section, whenever  H  and  L  are not 
                                                 
25 Our general equilibrium model could be used to derive and calculate excess burden, but we choose here 
to focus instead on distributional effects.  Suffice it to say that marginal excess burden per additional dollar 
of tax revenue is small when  eLZ  and  eHZ  are small.  It rises with the value of those parameters and 
becomes infinite at the peak of the Laffer curve where the extra revenue is zero.   
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“too” complementary, the denominator is positive (D1 > 0).  Then if high-skilled labor is 
a much better substitute for pollution, the low-skilled nominal net wage may fall.
26  Here 
we find that if  eLZ = –1, then  ˆ  w   is negative and   ˆ  h  is positive whenever  eHZ  is bigger 
than about 2.4 (still keeping eHL = 1).  These new parameter values are a bit different 
from those in Tables 4 and 5, but they generate a very different outcome.   
Conversely, we also consider the case where high-skilled and low-skilled labor 
are highly complementary with each other.  We take  eHL = –5 and then check for values 
of  eHZ  and  eLZ  where   ˆ  w   is negative.  For example,  eLZ = 10 and eHZ = 9 is a case 
where   ˆ  w  is negative, and   ˆ  h   is positive, even though low-skilled labor is a better 
substitute for pollution.  Other combinations of  eHZ  and  eLZ  also can make  w  fall, but 
their values must still be quite large. 
Other extreme parameters can yield other perverse outcomes such as a decrease in 
the price of the dirty good or an increase in pollution.  Without a comprehensive search, 
we were able to find one example where pollution rises (eHL = 5,  eHZ = –8, and  eLZ = 6, 
which imply that  eHH = –0.52,  eLL = –7.12, and  eZZ = –0.25).  The point is certainly not 
that a pollution tax is likely to raise pollution.  Rather, finding this one case confirms that 
only extreme elasticity values can generate perverse results. 
The intended effect of a tax rebate for low-income workers is for their net wage 
not to fall relative to the high-skilled wage.  However, we have identified several 
examples where a very different result is possible.  For policy reasons, it is important to 
understand that any intended protection of low-skilled labor may not be realized.  We 
have shown that even when the nominal low-skilled wage increases, low-skilled labor 
may still bear a disproportionate share of the tax burden.  Still, however, low-skilled 
labor in these cases could be hurt even more without the rebate. 
V.  Conclusion 
In order to evaluate different policies, it is important to understand not only the 
efficiency costs of environmental taxes but distributional effects as well.  Using pollution 
tax revenue to reduce pre-existing labor taxes can lessen the regressivity of the tax, and 
that might make a pollution tax more politically viable.  While the double dividend 
literature has focused on the efficiency side of this kind of tax swap, this paper considers 
equity issues and the circumstances under which real net wages may rise or fall.  The 
                                                 
26 Our numerical example does not exactly match Case 1, however, because factor intensities are not equal. 
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model developed here is simple but can provide key insights into the effects of a 
pollution tax increase and labor tax decrease on low-skilled and high-skilled workers. 
Using a general equilibrium model, we derive closed-form solutions for changes 
in wage rates of both types of workers, the price of the dirty good, and the amount of 
pollution.  We find perverse cases where the price of the dirty good may fall, or where 
pollution may rise, but these cases are unlikely and are not the point of this paper.  More 
to the point is that even without extreme parameter values, the use of the pollution tax 
revenue to cut low-income workers' labor tax may not raise their real net wage.  The tax 
cut for low-skilled workers certainly has a positive impact on the net low-skilled wage, 
but for three reasons this effect may not be enough to overcome the burden imposed by 
an increased pollution tax.  First, their real net wage may fall if high-skilled labor is better 
as a substitute for pollution than is low-skilled labor.  Second, it may fall if the dirty 
sector makes intensive use of low-skilled labor.  And third, of course, it may fall if low-
income families spend disproportionately on the dirty good. 
  In our numerical analysis, using reasonable parameter values, we find that the 
nominal net low-skilled wage increases in all cases, but low-skilled workers can still bear 
a disproportionate burden of the tax, due to the increase in the price of the dirty good.  
This numerical simulation does not provide definitive results for the incidence of this tax 
swap, but it does indicate what parameters need better estimation, and what values of 
those parameters make policy unable to offset the adverse effects of pollution taxes on 
low-income families.  
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Condition 2  (unskilled labor does not spend too disproportionately on Y):  
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Condition 4  (different enough factor inensities):   
γL −γ H >
−CσX










   
Condition 5  (similar enough factor intensities):    θXHθYZ
D3
(γL −γ H)(σUN + J)ˆ  τ  Z <−ˆ  τ  L    
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